Abstract-This paper studies the vulnerability of large-scale power systems to false data injection attacks through their physical consequences. Prior work has shown that a bi-level optimization problem can be used to determine the worst-case consequences of such attacks, wherein an attack aims to maximize the physical power flow on a target line subsequent to re-dispatch. This problem can be transformed into a mixed-integer linear program, but it is hard to solve on large systems due to numerical difficulties. Four computationally efficient algorithms to solve this problem are presented. These algorithms provide feasible attacks that cause line overflows, as well as upper bounds on the maximal power flow subsequent to any attack. Vulnerability assessments are conducted for the IEEE 118-bus system and the Polish system with 2383 buses using these algorithms.
I. INTRODUCTION
The efficiency and intelligence of modern electric power systems are increasing rapidly with integration of real-time monitoring, sensing, communication and data processing. This integration is accomplished via the cyber layer consisting of the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system in conjunction with the energy management system (EMS). SCADA monitors the physical system and collects measurements, which include voltage and current magnitudes, line power flows, as well as bus power injections, and then sends them to control center. In the EMS, state estimation (SE) estimates the system operating states (voltage magnitudes and angles) from measurements. This estimate along with the subsequential data processing, optimization and communication, including optimal power flow (OPF), allow for real-time control of the power systems.
However, the integration of the cyber layer also makes power systems more vulnerable to cyber-attacks which could result in serious physical consequences or even system failure, as illustrated by the recent cyber attack in Ukraine (see [1] ). Therefore, it is crucial to develop techniques to detect and thwart potential attacks, which requires evaluating system vulnerability to credible attacks. Assessing and evaluating consequences of possible attacks is extremely instructive for system operators, and is important for the secure operation of the power systems.
This paper focuses on false data injection (FDI) attacks that involve a malicious attacker replacing a subset of measurements with counterfeits. FDI attacks can be designed to target system states [2] - [4] , system topology [5] , [6] , generator dynamics [7] , and energy markets [8] . Optimization problems have been proposed to design FDI attacks that aim to maximize line power flow [9] , maximize operating cost [10] , [11] , or change locational marginal prices [12] . However, the results have only been demonstrated for small systems. Similar to [9] , we consider an optimization problem to determine the worst-case FDI attack that causes line overflow, but our goal is to design optimization algorithms that scale to significantly larger systems (i.e. thousands of buses).
In [9] , an FDI attack against SE that leads to an overflow is introduced. The system operator re-dispatches the generation subsequent to the attack, resulting in an overflow on a target line. A bi-level optimization problem is formulated to model such attacks in which the first level models the attacker's objective and limitations while the second level models the system response via OPF. Techniques to solve bi-level programs with applications to power systems have been studied in [11] , [13] , [14] , but the problems they study have the same objective for both levels, and hence their techniques cannot be applied to our problem. This bi-level optimization problem can be reformulated to a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) [15] , [16] by replacing the second level by its Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions. However, MPECs are non-convex and hard to solve efficiently in general [17] . Many heuristics have been applied to MPECs involving reformulations and relaxations [18] - [20] , but they typically require non-linear programs and/or proprietary solvers. Moreover, they do not guarantee optimality, convergence, nor speed. We have attempted to apply existing techniques to this MPEC (e.g. the SNOPT solver with Matlab interface), but in our experiments they failed to produce good solutions even on small-scale problems. In [9] , this MPEC is further reformulated to a mixedinteger linear program (MILP) by rewriting the complementary slackness constraints as mixed-integer constraints.
As the system size scales, the MILP formulated in [9] becomes harder to solve because the number of constraints and their associated binary variables increases with the size of the network. To overcome this difficulty, we introduce four computationally efficient algorithms to evaluate the vulnerability of systems. In some cases, these algorithms yield the optimal attack. In cases in which it is intractable to find the optimal attack, these algorithms provide lower and/or upper bounds on the objective value. A lower bound highlights a specific overflow vulnerability for the system since it represents a feasible attack. An upper bound, on the other hand, constitutes a limit on the severity of this class of attacks.
The first algorithm yields the optimal attack by reducing the number of line limit constraints and their associated binary variables using row generation [21] . The second algorithm further reduces the number of binary variables by judiciously eliminating generation limit constraints using column generation [21] . However, optimality cannot be guaranteed by this approach, so the algorithm only provides a lower bound on the objective. The third algorithm provides both lower and an upper bounds via a linear program (LP) that maximizes the difference between target line cyber and physical power flows.
In addition to these algorithms we previously presented in [22] , we introduce a fourth algorithm, which provides a lower bound on the objective by utilizing Benders' decomposition [23] to solve the original bi-level optimization problem instead of the re-formulated MILP. All four algorithms are tested on the IEEE 118-bus system and the Polish system (2383 buses) to evaluate system vulnerability. The outline of this paper is as follows. Sec. II describes the power system measurement and the attack model. Sec. III summarizes prior work formulating the bi-level optimization problem and converting it to an MILP. Sec. IV introduces the four new algorithms to find bounds on the solution of this optimization problem. Simulation results and concluding remarks are presented in Sec. V and VI, respectively.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We model the power system with n b buses, n br branches, n g generators, and n m measurements. For tractability reasons, DC power flow model is used, but the attacks introduced in this paper can also be used to create false data that bypass AC SE as in [9] .
A. Measurement Model
The DC measurement model is given as
where z is the n m × 1 measurement vector; x is the n b × 1 state vector (bus voltage angles); H denotes the n m × n b matrix describing the relationship between states and measurements; e is the n m × 1 measurement noise vector, whose entries are assumed to be jointly distributed as N (0,R) where
B. Attack Model
The attacker's knowledge and capabilities are described as follows:
1 :
1) The attacker is able to perform system-wide DCOPF.
2) The attacker controls measurements in a subset S of the network. An attack is defined to be unobservable if there exists an n b × 1 attack vector c = 0 such that for all i, the measurement i modified by the attacker satisfiesz i = z i + H i c, where H i denotes the i th row of H [9] . An attacker with control of the measurements in S can launch this attack if Hc has non-zero entries only in S. This form of attack was originally introduced in [2] .
For an attack vector c, load buses (i.e., buses with load) corresponding to non-zero entries of c are denoted center buses. Given an attack vector c, a subgraph S bounded by load buses can be constructed as in [4] that, if controlled by the attacker, can execute the unobservable attack associated with c. By modifying measurements only in S, the attacker can arbitrarily spoof the states of center buses without detection. The results of this unobservable attack will be seen by the system operator as load changes at load buses within S, while the total load of the system remain unchanged.
III. WORST-CASE LINE OVERFLOW ATTACKS
The authors of [9] introduce a bi-level optimization problem to find the worst-case unobservable line overflow attack given the attacker's limited resources to change states. The first level of this optimization problem is the attacker's problem, modeling its objective to maximize the power flow on a target line, subject to its limitations on: (i) resources to change states, characterized by the number of center buses in c; and (ii) detectability, characterized by the load shift, or the difference between the cyber (i.e. false) load and the original load, as a percentage of the original load. The second level is the system response to the attack, modeled by a DCOPF. It is demonstrated in [9] that this bi-level optimization problem can be re-formulated as an MILP. On the IEEE RTS 24-bus system, unobservable attacks found using this MILP are shown to successfully result in generation re-dispatch that causes a line overflow.
Instead of modeling the DCOPF problem using the B-θ method, this paper models it using the equivalent power transfer distribution factor (PTDF) formulation. Without loss of generality, we assume the flow on the target line is positive; if this is not the case, its absolute value can be maximized. We formulate the bi-level optimization problem as follows:
subject to
where the variables are as follows: c is the n b × 1 attack vector; P is the n br × 1 vector of physical line power flows; P l is the physical power flow of target line l; P G , P * G are n g × 1 vectors of generation dispatch variables and optimal generation dispatch solved by DCOPF, respectively; λ is the dual variable of the generation-load balance constraint; F ± , α ± are the dual variable vectors of the upper and lower bound of line limits, and the upper and lower bound of generation limits, respectively; and the parameters are: L S is the load shift factor; P D is the n b × 1 vector of active loads at each bus; N 1 is the l 1 -norm constraint integer; H is the n b × n b dependency matrix between power injection measurements and state variables; G B is the n b ×n g generator to bus connectivity matrix; C G is the cost function of the generation vector; P max is the n br × 1 vector of line limits; P min G , P max G are n g × 1 vectors of minimum and maximum generator outputs, respectively; σ is the weight of the norm of attack vector c. In the first level objective function, the penalty factor σ is chosen to be a small positive number to limit the attack size; constraint (2b) is the physical power flow equation; constraint (2c) models the attacker's limited resources to change states. Ideally, one should use the l 0 -norm to precisely capture the exact sparsity of c, but for tractability reasons we use the l 1 -norm as a proxy. Constraint (2d) limits the load changes to avoid detection. The second level in (2e)-(2h) models the system response to the attack as a DCOPF.
The bi-level optimization problem introduced above is nonlinear, but it can be re-formulated into an equivalent MILP as in [9] by the following modifications: 1) Introduce a slack vector s to linearize the l 1 -norm constraint in (2c) as
where L load is the set of load buses. As a result, the objective in (2a) simplifies to maximize c,s
2) Use the KKT optimality conditions (see [25] ) to replace the second level DCOPF as constraints (2f)-(2h), and
where constraint (5a) is the partial gradient optimal condition, (5b) is the dual feasibility constraint, and (5c)-(5e) represent the complementary slackness constraints. 3) Introduce new binary variables δ ± F , δ ± α and a large constant M to linearize the complementary slackness constraints as
The full problem is then converted to a single level MILP with objective (4), subject to (2b), (2d), (2f)- (3), (5a)-(5b), and (6). Henceforth, we refer to this optimization problem as the original MILP with P * l as its optimal objective value. As MILPs are in general NP hard, guarantees on polynomial time solutions cannot be provided. Furthermore, as the number of binary variables increasing with system size, the computational burden to solve this MILP also increases. We have found experimentally that the original MILP fails to converge in a reasonable length of time using solver Gurobi on the IEEE 118-bus system. Applying this optimization problem directly to evaluate the vulnerability of actual systems with thousands of buses to worst-case FDI attacks is intractable.
IV. COMPUTATIONALLY EFFICIENT ALGORITHMS TO SOLVE ATTACK OPTIMIZATION PROBLEMS
To overcome the computational difficulties brought on by a large number of binary variables, four computationally efficient algorithms are introduced in this section. Table I lists the key features of all four algorithms, in addition to the original MILP. We proceed to introduce each algorithm in detail. 
A. Row Generation for Line Limit Constraints
Row and column generation techniques are useful in solving large-scale linear programs. For constraints of the form Ax ≤ b, row generation retains only a subset of constraints (rows of A), and column generation retains only a subset of variables (columns of A). We iteratively add only those constraints and variables that are needed [26] [27] . These techniques help reduce the size of matrix A, and hence accelerate the solving process. Similar techniques have been used by power system operators for large-scale optimization problems, including unit commitment and security constrained economic dispatch (SCED), as shown in [28] and [29] . In our problem, row and column generation allow us to reduce the number of binary variables.
If a line is operating with very low power flows compared to their ratings, its rating, the corresponding line limit constraint is unlikely to be active in the optimal solution of the original MILP, and therefore, can be removed. If the cyber power flow of a line is beyond its limit, we say this line has cyber overflow. If there are any post-attack cyber overflows, the line limit constraints for those lines are added back to the attack optimization problem (new rows generated). If this algorithm terminates, the solution is guaranteed to be optimal (i.e. P * (RG) l = P * l ) because no constraints are violated.
Algorithm 1 Row generation for line limit constraints (RG) 1) Perform DCOPF for the whole system with no attack.
2) Let Q be the set of critical lines (i.e., lines whose power flows are more than 90% of ratings. 3) Remove the constraints corresponding to line k from (2g), (5a)-(5b), (6a), and (6b) for all k / ∈ Q. 4) Solve the reduced problem, and compute the cyber power flow of the system using the optimal dispatch P * (RG) G . 5) If cyber overflows exist, add all lines with cyber overflow to Q, and go back to 3). 6) Let P * (RG) l be the optimal objective value of RG.
B. Row and Column Generation for Line and Generator Limit Constraints
RCG modifies RG by further reducing the number of binary variables, now focusing on generator limit constraints. Since load changes are limited by constraint (2d), it is likely that in response to these load changes, only a small number of generators (denote as marginal generators) will re-dispatch. RCG reduces the number of binary variables associated with generator limit constraints by assuming the generation output of non-marginal generators remains unchanged after attack. Similar to RG, post-attack cyber overflow lines are added to the set of critical lines (new rows generated). In addition, generators whose post-attack generation are different from preattack values are added to the set of marginal generators (new columns generated). This ensures the system response to the attack predicted by the attacker is correct.
RCG can be efficiently applied to the Polish system with 2383 buses since the number of binary variables is significantly reduced. Since some of the variables P G are held constant, RCG is not guaranteed to yield the optimal solution for the Algorithm 2 Row and column generation for line and generator limit constraints (RCG) 1) Perform DCOPF for the whole system with no attack.
2) Let Q be the set of critical lines as defined in RG.
3) Let R be the set of generators g where P min Gg < P Gg < P max Gg . 4) Remove the constraints corresponding to line k and generator g from (2g)-(2h), (5a) and (6a)-(6c) for all k / ∈ Q and all g / ∈ R. 5) Solve the reduced problem and find the resulting generation dispatch P * (RCG) G and optimal attack vector c * RCG . 6) Use c * RCG to run post-attack DCOPF (2e)-(2h) to find system operator's corresponding dispatch P post G . 7) For all g that P * (RCG) Gg = P post Gg , if they belong to R, go to 8); Otherwise add them to R and go back to 4). 8) Use P * (RCG) G to calculate the cyber power flows. 9) If cyber overflows exist, add all lines with cyber overflow to Q, and go back to 4). 10) Let P * (RCG) l be the optimal objective value of RCG.
original MILP. However, it does provide a feasible solution, and hence, P * (RCG) l is a lower bound on P * l .
C. Cyber-Physical-Difference Maximization
The DM algorithm maximizes the post-attack power flow difference between physical and cyber power flows. Both lower and upper bounds on P * l can be derived using DM. Moreover, this algorithm only involves a linear program, and hence, can be applied efficiently on large systems. 
subject to (2b), (2d), (3).
2) Calculate the upper bound as
where PTDF l is the l th row of the PTDF matrix. 
The following theorem proves the DM algorithm.
Theorem 1. The upper and lower bounds from the DM algorithm satisfy
Moreover, if the post-attack cyber power flow of the target line is at its limit, then P * (DM,ub) l
Proof. The post-attack physical power flow on target line l is given by
This is a feasible solution, and hence, is a lower bound on P * l . Given an attack vector c, the post-attack cyber power flow on l is given by
Since the cyber power flow cannot exceed its limit,
Thus, we have
Therefore, since the optimization problem in (7) maximizes the second term in (14) (i.e. the difference between the cyber and physical power flows), P * (DM,ub) l as computed in (8) is an upper bound on P * l . If P cyber l = P max l , substituting this relationship into (11) and (12) proves P * (DM,ub) l
D. Modified Benders' Decomposition for Bi-level Linear Programs
In this section, we introduce the MBD algorithm to solve the bi-level optimization problem. Benders' decomposition [23] can be utilized to solve a linear program with complicating variables in a distributed manner at the cost of iteration [30] . It is a popular technique to solve optimization problems of large size or with complicating variables. It is also effective in solving complex optimization problems such as stochastic programs and mixed-integer linear programs. In Benders' decomposition, an optimization problem is decomposed into two sub-problems, wherein variables of each sub-problem are treated as constant in the other. The two sub-problems are solved iteratively until the solution converges. The MBD algorithm is formed by modifying the classic Benders' decomposition algorithm to apply it on the original bi-level optimization problem without converting it into an MILP.
The original bi-level optimization problem (2) can be written as the following general bi-level linear program, where x represents the attack vector c and y represents the generation dispatch P g (dual variables of the second level problem are in parentheses):
For example, c represents the term P l in (2a). Similarly, other terms can be determined. The second level problem (15c)-(15e), which represents the system response (DCOPF) to a fixed attack vector, has the following dual problem (note that x is treated as constant here since it is the fixed attack vector from the first level):
By weak duality [25] , for any feasible primal/dual pair, the dual objective value is always less than the primal one:
Since the DCOPF is a linear program, it satisfies strong duality. That is, any feasible point (y, β, γ) that satisfies
is an optimal solution to the second level problem. Therefore, constraints (15d), (15e), (16b), (16c), and (18) guarantee the optimality of the second level problem, and hence, can be used to convert the bi-level problem to a single level problem as:
The bilinear term γ T A 3 x in (19f) is non-convex and hard to solve. To overcome this difficulty, Benders' decomposition is utilized to decompose this optimization problem into two problems, with x as the variable for the master problem (MP) and y, β, γ as the variables for the slave problem (SP). The MP takes the following form:
where α is a variable introduced to represent d T 1 y * , which will then be updated by adding cuts. The SP takes the following form:
At the optimal solution of the SP given by (21), we have
An optimality cut can be added to the MP by taking the right hand side of (22) and replacing x * with x:
Note that if the SP is infeasible with a given x * , a feasibility cut is added to the MP instead:
The MP and SP can then be solved iteratively, with the MP updating x * and the SP updating cuts in each iteration. (24) to the MP. Otherwise, add an optimality cut of form (23) to the MP, and obtain the solution to the SP (y * (k) , β * (k) , γ * (k) ). 4) Solve the MP with added cuts and obtain the solution
The optimal objective value is obtained as c
Otherwise, let k = k+1 and go to step 2).
Solving the SP is equivalent to solving the second level DCOPF under attack (2e)−(2h), while the dual variables of the SP provide information on the objective function (2a). Since each cut is formulated linearly on the x domain, adding cuts to the MP does not affect its convexity. Thus, MBD is guaranteed to converge in a finite number of iterations [31] . However, due to the non-convexity of the original bi-level optimization problem, MBD is not guaranteed to give the global optimal solution [32] . Therefore, P * (MBD) l , the optimal objective value obtained by MBD, is a lower bound on P * l .
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we present numerical results using the algorithms described in Sec. IV. Two test systems are used, namely the IEEE 118-bus system and the Polish system. As stated in Sec. IV, we note that the convergence of RG is not computationally tractable for the Polish system in a reasonable length of time. Therefore, we only apply RCG, DM and MBD to the Polish system. Prior to the attack, the IEEE 118-bus system and the Polish system have 7 and 17 critical lines (lines with power flow over 90% of their limits) and 15 and 6 marginal generators, respectively. The vulnerability of these two systems are evaluated exhaustively by targeting all critical lines. The l 1 -norm constraint N 1 is chosen in the range [0.1, 1] for the 118-bus system and [0.1, 2] for the Polish system, both with increment 0.1. Throughout, Matlab, Matpower, and the Gurobi solver are used to perform the simulations. All tests are conducted using a 3.40 GHz PC with 32 GB RAM.
A. Computational Efficiency
The decrease in the number of binary variables characterizes the computational efficiency improved by RG and RCG. Table   TABLE II Fig. 1 illustrates the maximal power flow on target lines 104 and 141, respectively, when applying the four different algorithms described in Sec. IV on the IEEE 118-bus system with 10% load shift. We use this system to compare the bounds found by RCG, DM and MBD to the exact solution provided by RG; note, however, that RG is intractable for the Polish system.
B. Results on Maximal Physical Power Flows
Note that for target line 104 with any N 1 , all four algorithms yield the optimal solution of the original MILP. For target line 141, we see that P * (MBD) l < P * (DM,lb) l
, illustrating that P * (DM,lb) l and P * (DM,ub) l are not always tight bounds on P * l . RCG provides the optimal solution for all target lines we have considered in the 118-bus system.
Results for target lines 292, 24, and 1816 of the Polish system are illustrated in Fig. 2 . The load shift constraint is 10%. For target line 292, all four algorithms yield the optimal solution in the range
. For the remaining N 1 , our algorithms do not give the optimal solutions, since P * (DM,lb) l
. We observe that the upper and lower bounds do not match for target line 24, but MBD yields the tightest lower bound. For target line 1816, DM provides the tightest lower bounds. 
M a x i m a l P o w e r F l o w ( % ) 
C. Results on Attack Resources
Fig . 3 illustrates the relationship between maximal power flow and l 0 -norm of the attack vector (i.e. the number of center buses in the attack) versus the l 1 -norm constraint N 1 for target line 292 of the Polish system, with different load shift constraints. As N 1 increases, so does the l 0 -norm of the attack, indicating that l 1 -norm is a valid proxy for l 0 -norm for our problem. If a larger load shift is allowed, the maximal power flow on target line increases, but the resulting l 0 -norm decreases. This indicates a trade-off between load shift and attacker's resources: as the attacker attempts to avoid detection by minimizing load changes, it will require control over a larger portion of the system to launch a comparable attack. Similar results are also obtained on the IEEE 118-bus system. 
D. Line vulnerability
Since the objective of the attack is to maximize the physical power flow on a target line, it is intuitive that congested lines are more vulnerable to this attack. We have found experimentally that almost every congested line can be overloaded. One exception is line 176 in the IEEE 118-bus system. This is because line 176 is a radial line: it is the only line connected to a bus with a generator and no load. The line limit constraint in the OPF (2g) ensures that no possible dispatch could cause the line power flow to exceed the limit, even if based on counterfeit loads. In fact, any line with this radial configuration is immune to the proposed attack; moreover, these radial lines represent the only exceptions to our finding that congested lines can be overloaded. We have also found that lines that are not congested pre-attack may still be vulnerable to this attack, such as line 141 in the IEEE 118-bus system ( Fig.1(b) ) and line 2110 in the Polish system (Fig. 4) . 
E. Impact of Overall Congestion on Vulnerability
In the above, we have shown that virtually all critical or congested lines are vulnerable to overload. However, the extent of the vulnerability depends on several factors, such as the overall congestion of the system. This phenomenon is illustrated in Fig. 5 , which shows the worst-case attack for line 292 of the Polish system under different overall congestion levels. This overall congestion is adjusted by uniformly changing the line ratings for all lines. Note that higher line ratings mean a less congested system. As shown in Fig. 5 , as the overall congestion level increases, the maximal power flow on the target line also increases, even though the line is equally congested before attack in each case. 
VI. CONCLUSION
Four computationally efficient algorithms are introduced to evaluate the vulnerability of large-scale power systems to FDI attacks. We have found that all critical lines are vulnerable to the proposed attacks, with the exception of radial lines with a specific configuration. We have also found that systems with higher overall congestion are more vulnerable. Future work will include modeling security constraints in the system response formulation subsequent to an attack. Finally, our efforts will also include designing countermeasures to detect and thwart such attacks.
